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Google Confronts China’s
“Three Warfares”
TIMOTHY L. THOMAS

I

n early January 2010, Google announced that a computer attack originating from China had penetrated its corporate infrastructure (in midDecember) and stolen information from its computers, most likely source
code. The hackers also accessed the Gmail accounts of some human-rights
activists and infiltrated the networks of 33 companies. In April 2010, journalist John Markoff wrote:
A person with direct knowledge of the investigation now says that
the losses included one of Google’s crown jewels, a password system
that controls access by millions of users worldwide to almost all of
the company’s Web services, including e-mail and business applications. The program, code named Gaia for the Greek goddess of the
earth, was attacked in a lightning raid taking less than two days last
December, the person said.1

China’s recent incursions into US military computer networks and
Google’s cyber systems are of concern when viewed in isolation. They reflect a more serious problem when viewed as part of a short-term goal of
conducting “preemptive reconnaissance” that accommodates a longer-term
goal of affecting US military planning or the US economy. Many factors
indicate that this may be China’s goal.
Initially, this article examines the context within which the Google
attacks occurred and how Google’s response—abandoning censorship in
China—was used by the Chinese to distract attention from their planned
aggression. It then analyzes how a 2003 military regulation assisted China’s
response to Google’s accusations. In short, these procedures are being used
all too often by the Chinese and are causing US authorities to be more and
more intolerant of Chinese behavior.
Timothy L. Thomas is an analyst at the Foreign Military Studies Office at Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas, and the author of three books on Chinese information warfare.
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Why America Has Had Enough
Journalist Josh Rogin recently listed ten computer incidents that are
commonly known in the United States through press releases and government agency briefings. All parties damaged by the attacks suspect that the
Chinese are behind these incursions. The ten events are:
• 2004: Titan Rain, Federal Bureau of Investigation name for a
group of hackers from Guangdong province who stole information from
US military labs, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the
World Bank, and others.
• 2006: A US State Department official in East Asia opens an email that allows hackers to break into computers at US embassies all over
the region.
• 2006: US Representative Frank Wolf’s office is attacked. He is
an outspoken lawmaker on Chinese human-rights issues and suspects the
Chinese in the attack.
• 2006: The US Commerce Department had to discard all of its computers due to targeted attacks originating from China.
• 2006: The US Naval War College took all of its computers
offline after a major cyber attack in which China emerged as the main culprit.
• 2007: Secretary of Commerce Carlos Gutierrez finds spy software
on his computer following a trade mission trip to China.
• 2008: The presidential campaigns of both President-elect Barack
Obama and Senator John McCain are attacked by Chinese cyber spies.
• 2009: Senator Bill Nelson revealed attacks against his computer
had been traced to China.
• 2009: Toronto researchers find a massive cyber espionage ring using Chinese malware they call Ghostnet. The attacks penetrated 103 countries, and their origin was China.
• 2009: Lockheed Martin’s F-35 program is hacked and China
emerges as the main suspect.2
This list obviously does not include the hundreds of thousands of
“pings” (purpose unknown) that US Web sites have received from China
over the years, nor does it mention other specific incidents. And then along
comes Google.
How Serious was the Google Attack?
The attack on Google occurred in December 2009. Some sources state
that as many as 33 companies were victims of the hack attack.3 Alan Paller,
the director of the well-known information security training firm known as
the SANS Institute in Bethesda, Maryland, indicated just how invasive the
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attacks were, noting “the odds of the 25 biggest companies in California not
being fully compromised by the Chinese is near zero.”4 His analysis indicates the probes were serious
and highly effective. Fully
The Chinese are looking as closely
compromised? One hopes
at economic secrets as they are
that Paller was exaggerating
military or diplomatic secrets.
the threat, but there are many
reasons to believe he was not.
The attack itself on Google was so out of context, so odd, that US
Chinese cyber expert James Mulvenon called the event a “watershed moment in the cyber war.”5 Perhaps this was because the attack focused on
commercial firms, which had appeared to be a secondary option of the
Chinese in past attacks. Or perhaps it was because this was the first time
a commercial firm, Google, had actually come forward and admitted they
were under attack. Past practices had witnessed commercial companies
and banks remaining quiet when experiencing cyber attacks in an attempt
to retain consumer confidence. The Pentagon, on the other hand, has been
quicker to move and announce probes against their systems.
Acts of commercial espionage indicate that the Chinese are looking as closely at economic secrets as they are military or diplomatic secrets. Perhaps, after the thousands of attacks already attributed to China,
Chinese hackers have accomplished everything they wanted in government
spheres and have moved on to bigger prizes. Or perhaps they simply have
decided to alter their target methodology. In addition to Google, Adobe
Systems, Rackspace Hosting, and the Santa Barbara, California, software
maker CyberSitter all reported attacks.6 Sometime later, the law firm Gipson
Hoffman & Pancione (representing CyberSitter and Symantec), Juniper
Networks, Northrop Grumman, Yahoo, and Dow Chemical reported hits by
the attackers.7
A few months earlier, Northrop Grumman had published a report
that outlined various Chinese computer exploitation activities. The report
was written at the behest of the US-China Economic and Security Review
Commission. It indicated that Chinese activities against commercial firms
have been ongoing for quite some time. In particular, the report detailed
an extensive Chinese-based cyber mission conducted against an unnamed
US commercial firm a few years earlier. During this espionage case, the
Chinese utilized an extensive reconnaissance plan against the company that
continued over a number of months. Evidence suggesting a thorough reconnaissance effort can be implied from the attackers’ actions once the actual
intrusion plan unfolded. The perpetrators did not open and review files but,
due to their successful reconnaissance effort, simply began to copy and remove the files or folders they wanted. Their reconnaissance activities were
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so precise they were successful in stealing the information they sought. A
break-in of this nature could only have occurred after an accurate map was
made of the targeted network and files.8
When the time came to break into the company’s computer network, the cyber thieves utilized breach teams, collection teams, exfiltration
teams, and intermediate “staging servers” to accomplish their mission. The
Northrop Grumman report notes that “the exfiltration operation indicates
that their command and control architecture relied upon previously stolen
valid user accounts to breach the company’s internal servers.”9 This was a
sophisticated effort that acquired specific intellectual property.
Google responded by threatening to remove its censorship of certain
items from its Chinese network. This infuriated the Chinese and allowed
them to accuse Google of evading Chinese law. Eventually, Google moved
the focus of their Chinese Internet activities to Hong Kong.
Who Attacked Google?
On 18 February, David Barboza and fellow journalist John Markoff
questioned who might have committed the Google probes. Their primary
finding pointed to China although they offered other potential scenarios
as well.
Initially, the journalists noted the US National Security Agency and
other computer-security firms traced the attacks to servers in Taiwan. Then
citing “people involved in the investigation,” they reported that the attacks
were traced to two educational institutions in China. The journalists reported that a US defense contractor that had attacks similar to those that Google
experienced had identified an unusual suspect, a Ukrainian professor teaching at a Chinese vocational school, as the source behind the attacks.10
The Chinese institutions involved were identified as the Shanghai
Jiaotong University and the Lanxiang Vocational School. The journalists
noted that these institutions may have been used as fronts for government
agencies.11 Markoff and Barboza also conferred with Mulvenon and discovered that the Chinese have a different model for computer network exploitation operations. These operations incorporate volunteer “patriotic hackers”
in support. Other Chinese experts told the journalists that China has a highly
distributed approach to online espionage that makes it impossible to prove
where attacks originate.12
An interesting part of the article was the journalists’ ability to conduct interviews with two Chinese professors at Jiaotong University. One
professor said that an internal investigation at the university had already
started. The other said it was possible someone from the university was involved since an individual could commit an act of wrongdoing, or possibly
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the university Internet Protocol address was hijacked. Jiaotong is no ordinary university. It has ties with several US universities, to include Duke and
the University of Michigan, and to various US commercial entities such
as Microsoft and Cisco Systems. Jiaotong received funding from Chinese
Project 863 (China’s Information Technology Security Plan), has a School
of Information Security Engineering, and has People’s Liberation Army
ties, according to the university’s Web site. It has also hosted prominent
Chinese hackers for lectures.13 At least one of these hackers is antiwestern
and believed to have previously worked for Google.
A representative from the other school, the Lanxiang Vocational
School, said he doubted whether any of the high school graduates at his
school had the ability to hack Google or any other company. This may be a
bit of an understatement since the school’s computer laboratory is so enormous that it was listed in the Guinness Book of World Records. The school’s
Web site states that it sends a number of graduates to the armed forces. The
school’s dean, Mr. Shao, said graduates of the school’s computer science
department are recruited by the local military on an annual basis.14
Barboza and Markoff added that other computer industry executives
(and former government officials) said it “was possible that the schools were
cover for a ‘false flag’ intelligence operation being run by a third country.”15
Or perhaps, the attacks were the responsibility of criminal elements dealing
in industrial espionage.16 Thus, at the end of their article, the reader is wiser
but still not certain as to who committed the attacks. The majority of the
evidence, however, indicts China.
Chinese Responses to Google’s Accusations
Based upon the number of nations (Germany, India, Taiwan, Canada,
Australia, and England, among others) that have accused China of Internet
attacks, Chinese spokespersons have plenty of practice at denying their
nation’s involvement in cyber exploitation activities. These government
representatives have developed a standard, almost predictable, response. In
many respects the responses follow new military Regulations on Political
Work provided to Chinese propaganda specialists in 2003. This regulation
was written after China observed how the United States and its Coalition
partners used information during the intervention in Iraq. Possibly, civilian
propaganda agencies were given the same information. Chinese politicalmilitary commissars were instructed as to how individuals should explain
events via the conduct of media warfare, legal warfare, and psychological
warfare in times of peace and conflict.
Chinese regulations note that it is the media’s job to support a righteous cause, the legal expert’s job to justify the cause, and the psychological
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warfare personnel’s job to bolster friendly morale while attacking the enemy’s morale. This is how the media can be used to control public opinion and eliminate any chance of China “losing face.” The “three warfares”
permit China to enter any fray, whether in peace or war, with a political
advantage that can be used to alter public or international opinion.
An analysis of the aftermath of the Google probes provides an example of this process. The initial Chinese responses to Google’s accusations
were offered by many of the same agencies that the Chinese have used in
the past. Initially, a Foreign Ministry spokesman (Ma Zhaoxu) said, “foreign
enterprises in China need to adhere to China’s laws and regulations, respect
the interests of the general public and cultural traditions, and shoulder corresponding responsibilities. Google is no exception.”17 Ma did not indicate
that China would investigate Google’s accusations nor did he mention the
grounds for Google’s decision to remove censorship, namely that someone
in China had attacked its infrastructure. Chinese authorities dismissed the
accusations as groundless. Psychologically, Ma used the stratagem of diverting attention away from the real issue under consideration, the probes,
and redirected the focus to various legal issues.
The real issue at stake is that the Chinese were accused of stealing
source code and conducting espionage (or stealing proprietary information)
from 33 companies. The initial accusation of espionage is more important
than China’s after-the-fact accusation that Google was violating China’s
rules and regulations regarding censorship. Google did not violate rules and
regulations before the event. It followed Chinese law. It stated that it would
violate its censorship agreement only after the probes on Google’s systems
transpired and the Chinese refused to take responsibility or aid in finding the
culprit. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made a strong diplomatic statement in support of Google, stressing many of the same issues.
And what was the Chinese response to Secretary Clinton’s statement? The Zhaoxu news agency said Clinton’s singling out China was
inappropriate and misguided and constituted an inappropriate meddling
in Chinese affairs.18 Again, who was meddling in whose affairs? Another
Foreign Ministry spokesman, Jiang Yu, said, “China’s Internet is open” and
China “welcomes international Internet corporations to do business in China
in line with the law.”19 Such subjective responses are specifically designed
to undermine the accuser’s line of reasoning.
Next, in typical Marxist-Leninist fashion, the Chinese relied on the
old “counterpoint” tactic from the Communist playbook. Google accused the
Chinese of collecting data on human-rights advocates, so China accused the
United States of human-rights violations in one of its responses. Then, since
Google and other US journalists implied Chinese government collusion in
the espionage activities, the Chinese next implied White House collusion
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in using commercial markets (such as Google) for political purposes, yet
another counterpoint tactic. A China Daily Internet commentary noted that
four of Google’s former executives hold positions in the US government,
to include Sumit Agarwal, now a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Public Affairs Outreach and Social Issues.20 The commentary went on
to note that Google was the fourth-largest contributor to President Barack
Obama’s presidential campaign. Counterpropaganda today is perhaps an
element of what might be termed soft psychological power.
Foreign Ministry spokesmen were not the only ones to address
Google’s accusations against the Chinese. Several military officials also
joined in the renunciation and diversion. Huang Xueping, a Defense Ministry
spokesman, stated that Google’s claims were baseless, irresponsible, and
hyped with ulterior motives.21 Li Daguang of National Defense University
stated that some western powers had adopted a strategy to sabotage China’s
information technology development and that their high-profile criticism
is a preemptive strike on China.22 Li Yizhong, Minister of Information and
Technology, stated that Google must obey China’s laws and that China opposes hacking.23 While many more defensive accusations were levied at
Google, the three mentioned here represent the categories of media, psychology, and law. Other sources used to put out the official propaganda
ranged from representatives of the Academy of Military Science to publications such as the Central Party School.
In addition, other propaganda materialized two months after
Google’s initial accusations and involved the imposition of strict control
over Chinese media outlets. Two major groups were targeted: editors and
mangers, along with monitoring and control groups.
When addressing Google issues, chief editors and managers of
Chinese propaganda outlets were told to use only central government media content; not to change titles when reposting; not to produce relevant
topic pages, discussion sessions, and related investigative reports; not to
permit forums and blogs to hold discussions or investigations on Google;
to clean up text that attacks the Party, state, government agencies, and
Internet policies or sites that support Google; and to monitor Google information and incidents.
Monitoring and control groups were told to immediately conduct
follow-up and control actions; not to participate in Google’s information
releases; not to report that Google is exerting pressure on China; and not to
provide materials for Google to attack relevant policies.24 Such instructions
are representative of standard Chinese propaganda practices.
David Berlind, writing for InformationWeek, felt the US response
(excluding Secretary Clinton’s) to Chinese actions was “wimpy.” He wrote
that the response indicated that the United States fears China since the latter
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now holds a winning hand for four reasons: the United States needs China
to support our growing national debt; we need China to manufacture much
of what we consume; we depend on the growth of China’s economy for
our growth since we have little domestic production; and we need China
to keep North Korea in line.25 The longer western nations take to send a
strong message to the Chinese, the more credible Berlind’s accusation
appears. Secretary Clinton’s initial response was the quickest and most
pointed to date.
Chinese Thinking Adapts to the Digital Age
Several classical Chinese stratagems fit the latest Internet behavior
and indicate possible trouble in the future. A stratagem is an action or plan
designed to mislead an adversary’s perception, thinking, emotion, or will.
In nearly every case stratagems attempt to divert an opponent’s attention
and lead them down an incorrect logic path. Stratagems support Sun Tzu’s
dictum that “all war is deception.”
The constant reconnaissance efforts that China conducts against
countries around the globe indicate that China, along with developing new
technologies, is trying to fulfill the stratagem of “win victory before the
first battle,” that is, find the vulnerabilities in another system and be ready
to exploit them. This type of activity could lead to a military victory in time
of conflict or result in an economic victory. The reconnaissance activities
reported by Alan Paller against the 33 largest companies in California serve
as a good example of these types of activities. Securing an economic victory
would also fulfill the stratagem of “win victory without fighting.” Chinese
actions over the past several years seem to accommodate this stratagem.
China espouses a policy of peace and kindness while continuing to conduct
persistent cyber attacks, that is “make noise in the west, attack in the east.”
Finally, the constant repetition of the slogan that China is developmentally
way behind the United States and other western nations fulfills the stratagem
“appear weak when strong.”
Chinese reconnaissance activities are aggressive and intrusive, a
stark departure from its more traditional military strategy that focused on the
active defense. Digital-age practices have resulted in greater emphasis on the
offensive and attaining the initiative. Now, while emphasizing peaceful rhetoric, the Chinese also talk openly about acquiring advantages. The military
has been particularly aggressive in this respect, pursuing both the theory and
practice of information warfare activities. The People’s Liberation Army has
manifested this tendency by seeking preemptive opportunities via the reconnaissance of other nations’ network technologies whenever possible.
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Prominent US officials have taken note of this offensive behavior
and pointed their cyber-espionage finger directly at China. In November
2007 testimony before the US-China Economic and Security Review
Commission, General James Cartwright, then Vice Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, blamed China for cases of cyber-espionage. He was particularly concerned about China’s use of denial-of-service attacks.26 During
Cartwright’s testimony, he stated:
The data collected from these computer reconnaissance campaigns
can be used for myriad purposes, including identifying weak points
in the networks, understanding how leaders in the United States think,
discovering the communication patterns of American government
agencies and private companies, and attaining valuable information
stored throughout the networks.27

Both civilian and military Chinese sources have written about this
growing cyber offensive, particularly regarding its economic nature. The
journal China Military Science has devoted a number of articles to topics associated with Internet warfare and China’s interest in developing offensive
cyber options. In 2009 Senior Colonel Wang Wei, a professor at the Nanjing
Military Academy’s Information Warfare and Command Department’s
Military Theory Teaching and Research Office, and Major Yang Zhen, a
lecturer at the same office, noted that a sovereign state’s political system,
economic potential, and strategic objectives will be the primary targets attacked in any war against an informatized society. The authors advocated
that it is necessary to “defeat the superior with the inferior” and “fight in a
way different from how the adversary acts,” once again referencing stratagems to buttress their arguments and activities.28 They espoused that in
peacetime, the organized integration of military and economic effects must
be achieved; and that in People’s War under informatized conditions, both
financial and trade warfare must be carried out.29 Such writings can be interpreted to mean that at least some military officers consider that China is
currently at war on the Internet.
In another 2009 China Military Science article, Colonel Long
Fangcheng and Senior Colonel Li Decai analyzed the role of soft power
and its impact on what the Chinese term “comprehensive national power.”
Somewhat arrogantly, the authors appear to believe that hacker attacks will
not lead to any type of severe repercussions from the state under attack.
Perhaps this conclusion is based on the current weak responses of nations.
Regarding the use of soft power as an economic tool, the authors
suggest:
In informatized wars, because various types of economic and social
activities are based on computers, information, and the Internet to a
large extent, social economic life and political life will more heav-
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ily depend on various types of information systems. Information and
information systems are weapons…. Paralyzing the enemy country’s
economy, causing social turmoil to the enemy country, imposing the
will of war on the opponent does not lead to large-scale engagements
in a traditional sense, and can be effected in a form of soft attacks
through network attacks, hacker invasions, and large-scale media
warfare, psychological warfare, and legal warfare through news media. Thus the boundary between the state of peace and the state of war
will become fuzzy.30

Fangcheng and Decai appear to be making the mistaken assumption
that an attack on another nation’s economy will not lead to any large-scale
response. This is dangerous thinking on the part of the Chinese. There is a
threshold at which America and other nations will rapidly respond.
An example of a civilian source that emphasizes economic and digital issues is the Chinese book Internet Wars. It also focused on the Internet
confrontation in general. The book has 18 chapters. Several chapters draw
the reader’s attention immediately. They are: “The Inevitable Internet War;”
“Battles for Internet Control;” “Offensive and Defensive Internet Wars;”
“The Internet Will Determine Victory in Future Wars;” “Dangerous Virtual
Reality;” and “Financial Wars in the Internet World.”31 The latter should be
of particular interest to US analysts.
Dr. Joel Brenner, who worked for the Director of National
Intelligence from February 2007 to January 2009, has called China’s economic espionage against the United States a national security risk.32 The
United States is, however, initiating actions to confront this risk. In April
2009, the Office of the Secretary of Defense hosted an information warfare simulation focusing on financial attacks on the US economy and the
consequences of manipulating financial markets. China, according to one
account, proved to be the “savviest economic warrior.” Financial specialist
Paul Bracken, one of the participants, was worried over the possibility that
China might incrementally sell dollars in an attempt to increase economic
uncertainty in the United States.33
Meanwhile, evidence continues to grow from a number of sources
regarding China’s economic superiority. Chinese military experts Qiao
Liang and Wang Xiangsui, authors of the highly popular and controversial
work Unrestricted Warfare, have written in another book that the control of
the world economic sector has become a goal for the Chinese. They noted
that “war with the objective of expanding territory has already basically
withdrawn from the state of history, and even war with the objective of
fighting for natural resources is now giving way to war with the objective of
controlling the flow of financial capital.”34

110

Parameters

Google Confronts China’s “Three Warfares”

People engaged in the world of business activities agree on one
thing, the Chinese are excellent at espionage. Most businesspersons readily
understand that their Blackberrys, laptops, and cell phone are all compromised once they enter the mainland of China. They also come to expect the
bugging of their cars, hotel rooms, and casual conversations. Businessmen
feel neutered entering negotiations with the Chinese. Many have noted that
it seems as if the Chinese knew every proposal they were going to make and
had responses in hand.
China is not overly concerned with privacy issues as we are in the
United States. In fact, the state has the preponderance of control over individual cyber rights. This permits the Chinese government to act freely
regarding the management of information or its monitoring. The Chinese
can establish their own rules for anything they claim to own. This translates
into myriad trade restrictions and tariffs, not to mention the undervaluing
of the yuan. Outside agencies and customers complain that doing business
with China means putting up with their insistence on controlling such activities and actions as foreign encryption protocols companies use to protect
sensitive data. Certifications to do business on the mainland are held up
until companies comply with Chinese demands, according to Oded Shenkar,
a business management professor at the Ohio State University.35 A 2009
report from the European Union’s Chamber of Commerce in China noted
that China integrated requirements guaranteeing protectionism into various
standardization policies, required for the subjective enforcement of environmental rules favoring Chinese firms. Such policies make it much easier to
commit the theft of intellectual property.36
The Chinese utilize any number of espionage tools and establish the
rules and regulations that stifle attempts by foreign business to participate
as an equal in the Chinese market. This is how the Chinese play the game.
Conclusions
The Chinese probes of the world’s cyber domains have not ceased.
Recently, Canadian researchers uncovered a massive Chinese espionage
campaign targeting India. In their report, Shadow Network, they outlined
the massive campaign emanating from Chengdu, China that harvested a
huge quantity of data from India’s military and commercial files.
China’s activities against Google and India (and their reconnaissance
activities in general) portend a much broader pattern, a long-term strategy
to hold military and economic assets of various nations hostage. There are
a number of Chinese books that support this supposition. Gaining the high
ground in international digital competition is becoming a national objective
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for the Chinese. China’s previous activities certainly afford them a political
advantage in any future conflict.
The espionage threat emanating from China is real; and the United
States needs to focus on protecting military and economic Internet capabilities if it is to be successful against China’s digital reconnaissance effort.
Particular focus should be placed on protecting the US military’s supply and
logistics information, along with financial programs and data. (For example,
how might China utilize acquisition of US bonds; or how might Chinese
laws and regulations potentially thwart US government and business initiatives?) The challenges for the United States are great, as are the opportunities for China to inflict substantial damage via digital means. The continuing
menace of these Chinese electrons remains a subject of conjecture (what is
their intent?) that should keep analysts busy throughout the coming years.
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